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least most of them.

3. It is then this myth that we wish to argue against and show that it is based on insufficient analysis. Also, if we have acted through psychological warfare agencies so as to increase such alleged fears among the Bolsheviks, we have been wasting our energies and our time. This is a very general statement and, as all extreme positions, must not be taken literally, but rather to mean that we could be using our energies and our time more effectively. This paper plans to show the rationale for the following assertion: No matter how many purges there may have been in the past, the present (present leaders here means leaders at any time under consideration; the adjective is not related only to the leadership of 1954) Bolshevik leaders are not afraid of one another and such fears cannot be therefore increased, nor can they be generated.

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The Nature of the Problem

4. Looking backward into the history of purges among the Bolsheviks, one phenomenon is startling. For it no explanation, to our best present knowledge, has been offered, and certainly no adequate explanation. Why is it that very powerful individuals can be removed, tried (sometimes), punished, and even executed without causing any turmoil whatever by attempting to defend themselves effectively? In other words, why have the purges among the Bolsheviks been always one-way purges? We could search through the pages of historical books for evidence that this has been so. We would start with Trotsky, who had been the Secretary of the Red Army until shortly before his removal. We could take: The "Case of the Army" during the purges of the 30's naming, by the way of an example, Marshal Tukhachevsky, Generals Yakir, Ubovich, Kork, Feldman, Eideman, Primakov, Putna; two years (not quite) later the jury which tried these soldiers, Generals Alinis, Bluscher, Dybenko, Belov, Kashirin (with the exception of Budenny and Shaposhnikov). Take the three secret police chiefs--Yagoda, then Yezhov, and then LBeria; we find the same pattern.
5. Why did these powerful individuals not rise to their own defense? It has been assumed that these individuals were actually powerful and did have possible or potential defenses available to them. This assumption is warranted as obviously the Army leaders could have ordered the armies under their specific command to help them. In the Tukhachevsky trials I find still other types of evidence. Some 20 thousand officers were removed and purged after the purge of Tukhachevsky and his associates. These were evidently officers whom Tukhachevsky supported, recommended, and promoted. I find also that after Beria's purge an estimated 12 thousand secret police members were purged. At least these individuals might have constituted the potential defensive striking force. From these, and many such considerations, I must come to one only logical conclusion. The powerful Bolsheviks were purged without even lifting a finger to their own defense because they were caught by surprise. In other words, they did not expect to be purged. Since they did not expect it, they could not have been afraid of it. It can be said that the possibility never entered their minds. This does not explain the reasons for which they should not have expected to be purged, but it establishes the grounds on which I can pursue an analysis fruitfully.
6. In this note I have taken the accomplished purges as facts. It can be argued that if an individual with defenses available to him did not actually act to defend himself, the purge came as a surprise to him. Since the fear of others (of being purged) must be logically equated (or can be equated) with the admission by that Bolshevik that he might be purged by his Comrades, the absence of the expectation denotes the absence of fear.

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The Vicious Circle of Bolshevik Loyalty

7. Let the reader put himself into the position of a leading Bolshevik, let us say the late LP Beria. First of all, the reader will find himself (in the role of Comrade Beria) believing that the destiny of the Communist Party is the destiny of mankind. To promote this destiny he has devoted his lifetime. In 1924 or thereabouts the reader, as Beria, would find himself suppressing rebellions by "misguided" Caucasian tribes. He would find himself in numerous positions of distinction within the Bolshevik hierarchy. He would replace Yezhov in 1938 and be conducting all purges of deviants ever since until his own downfall. All these things he would be doing for the benefit of the Party no matter how much or how little personal ambitions might have entered into his mind and into the motivational picture. The reader, as Beria, would think of himself as, indeed, an excellent Bolshevik. Nothing in his past would have ever suggested that he was not a good Bolshevik. Surely, he might have made some mistakes but he always readily confessed and self-criticized himself.
8. Subjectively, the reader would always have a certainty that his own loyalty is beyond doubt, beyond suspicion. The reason is simple because, as he would see the picture, his (Bolshevik) loyalty was indeed unimpeachable and as a Bolshevik he certainly was beyond suspicion. This knowledge of one's own integrity and unimpeachability is no breeding grounds for fears of other Comrades: "We are saying here that the reader, putting himself into that understandable position, would have and could have no reasons for such fears (ie, that he might be purged by his Comrades) because he knew that he, as a person and a Party man, had never acted against the Party but always for its benefit. What about all the purges of other powerful Bolsheviks? Would their precedent not fill him with fear that the same thing might happen to him? The answer we are giving is simple - it would not. Why? Most of the purged individuals that you as Beria would have seen liquidated confessed to their specific crimes. Beria (or the reader in his shoes) would, of course, not idealize the investigative methods, the details of which he would likely not know anyway. He would be certain that an innocent individual would not have confessed and even more so that an innocent individual would not have been arrested in the first place, for, preceding the arrest, some evidence of criminality must have been present and submitted.
9. We are envisaging Beria to react in the very human manner in thinking, "Where there is smoke, there is fire." Thus, once there is smoke it becomes the duty of the Party and its organs to find and quench the fire. It is no more a question of whether there is or there is not fire. It is quite likely that the reader, in Beria's position, might have doubted some of the charges (ie, their validity) against some of the liquidated individuals. It is the contention of the analyst that Beria certainly believed to the last minute (prior to his own arrest) that no completely innocent individual had ever been punished by the regime. Yet, being himself completely innocent, how could it ever have occurred to him that the same fate was awaiting him in a future not too remote?
10. This discussion, up to this point, hints still at another problem. In a democratic society, and a society remains democratic only as long as this is the case, crimes or transgressions by individuals of a societal code are specifically defined. A thief knows that he is stealing, with the exception of the kleptomaniac, of course; an embezzler knows that he is embezzling and he knows when he is doing so.
11. In a totalitarian society some of the most important deviations are defined in the most vague sense. By this, political crimes differ from civil crimes. The Bolsheviks, under the self-deceiving myth of dialectic materialistic objectivity, do not nor cannot (for this is a matter of faith with them while we may see it quite clearly) realize that the severest

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punishments are administered for crimes that are the most vague, the most obscure, undefined, and undefinable (ie, objectively undefinable), and that criminality in the political sense always reduces not to issues of evidence but to what those in power believe to be criminal at the time. The major practical weakness of the Soviet leadership, which we do not seem to have exploited in any way yet, is not that these assertions as made above hold but that it is impossible, once a Bolshevik is a Bolshevik, to realize fully that they hold.

A Summary of Practical Implications

12. We have devoted some time to showing that while powerful individuals in the Bolshevik system get purged they do not defend themselves, and that they do not defend themselves because they do not expect to be purged, and since they do not expect to be purged are not afraid of their Comrade leaders. From this at least one observation follows. No matter how we go about it, we cannot convince a given Bolshevik leader that he ought to fear his Comrades. Suppose we have evidence that, let us say, Anastasi Mikoyan is about to be purged. Suppose we [redacted] approach Mikoyan and tell him, "Look, Mikoyan, better do something about it. Here's the evidence that, let us say, Malenkov is about to liquidate you." His is bound to be a reaction of disbelief and even ridicule, for he thinks that we want to trick him and that we forged the evidence. This he thinks not because under no circumstances would he lend us his ear and believe what we say, but because he - as he knows but too well - committed no acts against his Party and against Bolshevism.
13. If we decide to look at the Bolshevik purges and individual reactions to them in about this fashion, what follows? Does it mean that, since we cannot promote the nonexistent fear of one another and since we cannot generate such fears, we are helpless? It is this problem that we wish to deal with in the remainder of this paper for, it appears to this analyst, we are far from being helpless.

Purges - A Weakness of the Regime?

14. I said at the outset of this document that discarding of the fear-among-the-leaders theory is not being done in order that I may show how the theory is inadequate, but because I wish to replace it by a better one; secondly, because I wish to use the new theory to consider some possibilities of practical action by our own psychological warfare agencies. We may rephrase our question slightly - Do the purges weaken the Bolshevik regime or do they not? No amount of theorizing how in many subtle ways purges may weaken the regime, can outweigh the evidence that weakening results do not necessarily follow a purge. This is true only insofar as we can establish that purges occur only in "one direction." This means - when a given individual and perhaps his associates are purged by the power holders without defending themselves actively. We have said, and can substantiate by large quantities of historical data, that all purges hitherto have been in this sense - one-way purges.
15. Had a few, or all, of the purged-to-be individuals defended themselves, in their desire to survive, such purges would have resulted in what, from our viewpoint, may appear to be a power struggle. Such purges I intend to call two-way purges. Suppose Beria had mobilized some of his friends in the secret police to fight back. His arrest would not have been smooth, as it obviously must have been. A fight would have resulted and the surviving leadership group might have had an opportunity to break down into pro-Berians and anti-Berians. In this manner the regime would definitely, at least for the duration of such a struggle, be considerably weakened.

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16. If what we want to do is weaken the Soviets it must follow that we wish to create conditions in which such two-way purges (as I defined them) replace the simple one-way purges. We will then expect an internal struggle which is bound to weaken the Bolsheviks. Can this be done? The answer is an unqualified "Yes", although the techniques for doing so might have to be developed first. The development of such techniques is beyond the scope of this paper. I wish merely to give an adequate rationale and background for the possibility of doing precisely that. In practical terms this means: Instead of watching a Beria arrested, tried, and executed - with subsequent arrests and liquidations of many of his associates - we would prefer to see a situation in which Beria, aware of the conditions, would assemble his closest friends and act to defend himself.
17. In our previous notes we discarded the "motive of fear" that might function as the springboard for such self defenses. In fact, we asserted that Beria did not defend himself although his very life was at stake because he had no expectation of things to come. We also stated that we believed that he could not have been made by anyone to believe that his life was endangered. Now is the remark of our previous paragraph congruous with these views?

The Motivation for Self Defense

18. Let the reader put himself once more in the position of a Bolshevik leader. The reader then is completely unsuspecting that some of his Comrades are planning his removal for he has been behaving as an excellent Bolshevik all his life. How can the reader in this position be motivated to rise to self defense, and thus *de facto* bring about two-way purges and an internal struggle? He must be under the impression that he is defending the interests of the Party against deviants rather than that he is defending himself, a deviant, against the Party. The human relational universe of our reader, in the shoes of a Bolshevik leader, is filled with many Comrades. Yet, his attitude toward them is not a uniform attitude nor is their attitude, as he sees it, toward him a uniform one. Some of the people in his social orbit he considers to be his very close friends and he believes that they think of him as their friend. Others he thinks of as needing him or needing his favor, love, approval, etc. He might feel that they, too, realize this. Still others he thinks are fairly cold to him and he may be cold with regard to them. There are some he dislikes and some of them he knows, or suspects, dislike him. Others whom he might even like he is sure dislike him, etc.
19. All in all, one generalization seems useful. The reader, in the Bolshevik's shoes, is likely to watch carefully for actions by those he dislikes or those whom he suspects dislike him. We can picture him defining such people in a very simple manner. Being a good Bolshevik, how can some people not like him? Perhaps because they are not very good Bolsheviks or perhaps because they are afraid that he will find out something about them. In this case, he is likely to accept at its face value any derogatory information that comes to him unless it comes from completely unreliable sources. He is likely to believe that people he dislikes or people who dislike him are deviants and when provided with any evidence to that effect whatever, he will feel that he must rise to the defense of the Party against such ambitious, deviant, traitorous, opportunistic, suspicious individuals. While, as we see it, he will rise to self defense, such a Bolshevik will actually believe that he is acting very unselfishly and that he is about to defend the Party, the people, and everything dear to him.

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20. An important lesson follows, a practical lesson. Two-way purges are likely to occur if the referent individuals (the two opposites) each believe that they are defending the Party against a deviant and when they each believe that they are right and one other one wrong. This is a belief that can be introduced into the picture both from the inside as well as from the outside. The belief that one must defend himself because the others consider him a deviant cannot be generated and since it cannot be generated, it can never provide motivation for action. The belief that the others (some of the others) are deviants and that our action against them is being done in order to protect the larger societal interests and the Party (mankind), can certainly be fostered for, latently, with regard to individuals we dislike, such a disposition is present in any case. In this paper we shall not discuss how this can be done for the development of techniques will depend on the analysis of specific relational configurations around each individual leader.
21. This analysis, if correct, provides a vehicle for unleashing two-way purges in the Soviet system. It can succeed inasmuch as it employs latent (and thus existing but not necessarily overt) tensions among the leaders and as long as it is directed to manipulate individual behavior in the only direction in which it is easily manipulatable. Manipulation, while it wishes to achieve the opposite results, must follow the lines of reasserting the Bolshevik dogma in the Bolsheviks. To prove the point, we need not study Bolshevism only. In fact, in this one feature all fanatic believers, including, for example, the religious ones, resemble one another. The personal certainty that "one is right" and that "one stands on the right side of the fence" without reservation and qualification breeds intolerance. If only one strictly delimited way of looking at things is right, all others must ipso facto be wrong. In political fanatics the assertion that someone else is wrong usually is associated with "that someone is socially dangerous", "criminal", "traitorous", etc., which motivates even the most brutal action.

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